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THE BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS ON BIG TECH
Roger P. Alford
ABSTRACT
This Article contends that there is an emergent bipartisan consensus that Big
Tech has grown too powerful and that action must be taken to address its abuse
of power. That action takes the form of a variety of legislative proposals to
enhance government enforcement powers, reform the merger laws, and address
self-preferencing, data portability, and interoperability. Litigation efforts focus
on Facebook and Google’s abuse of monopoly power, particularly with respect
to Facebook’s elimination of competition through acquisitions and Google’s
abuse of monopoly power in search and display advertising. While we are in the
midst of one of the most divisive and polarizing periods in our nation’s history,
there is a strong bipartisan consensus on the perils of Big Tech and a desperate
need to do something about it.
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INTRODUCTION
We are in the midst of an antitrust moment. After decades of lax antitrust
enforcement against monopolies, the Trump administration, in its waning days,
filed two of the most important monopoly cases in history against Google and
Facebook.1 Shortly thereafter, almost every state attorney general joined several
complaints against Google and Facebook for abuse of their monopoly power in
search, online advertising, and social media.2
The Biden administration has appointed antitrust leaders that promise to be
aggressive enforcers against monopoly abuse in the technology sector.3
President Biden also signed an Executive Order that recognized “a whole-ofgovernment approach . . . to address overconcentration, monopolization, and
unfair competition in the American economy.”4 Among the principal concerns
of that Executive Order is the “small number of dominant internet platforms
[that] use their power to exclude market entrants, to extract monopoly profits,

1

See infra notes 186, 193–97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 187–89, 201–22 and accompanying text.
3
See Jim Tankersley & Cecilia Kang, Biden’s Antitrust Team Signals a Big Swing at Corporate Titans,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/24/business/biden-antitrust-amazon-google.
html.
4
Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021).
2
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and to gather intimate personal information that they can exploit for their own
advantage.”5
Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress have introduced a number
of far-reaching legislative proposals to address Big Tech’s monopoly practices.6
Senators Amy Klobuchar and Josh Hawley have both published hefty books on
the history of antitrust law and the risks we face today from concentrated power
in the technology industry.7 Progressive liberals, like Senator Elizabeth Warren,
run presidential campaigns on a platform of breaking up Big Tech companies.8
Meanwhile, traditional conservatives, like Senator Mike Lee, remain steadfastly
loyal to traditional antitrust principles but apply those principles against digital
platforms. Senator Lee, in a keynote speech to NetChoice, a technology lobbying
group, said that “the only people who still argue that there’s no reason to be
concerned about competition in Big Tech are the ones paid by Big Tech to say
so.”9 He also remarked that “the idea that Big Tech operates in a functioning
free market can no longer be taken as a serious position.”10
Even Justice Clarence Thomas has weighed in, expressing concern over the
“unprecedented . . . concentrated control of . . . speech in the hands of a few
private parties. We will soon have no choice but to address how our legal
doctrines apply to highly concentrated, privately-owned information
infrastructure such as digital platforms.”11 Such musings suggest that there is
little doubt that cases challenging Big Tech’s concentrated power will eventually
find their way to the Supreme Court.

5

Id.
See infra notes 93–178 and accompanying text.
7
See generally AMY KLOBUCHAR, ANTITRUST: TAKING ON MONOPOLY POWER FROM THE GILDED AGE
TO THE DIGITAL AGE (2021) (discussing remedies to the growing monopolization in the United States with a
focus on Big Tech companies); JOSH HAWLEY, THE TYRANNY OF BIG TECH (2021) (discussing the history of
monopolies, how Big Tech became the “natural successor” of the corporate barons of the Gilded Age, and how
to return to the “common man’s republic”).
8
See Astead W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Breaking Up Tech Giants Like Amazon and
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-amazon.
html.
9
NetChoice, American Antitrust: Reforms to Create Further Innovation and Opportunity, YOUTUBE
(June 22, 2021) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pToFy8BY5C4.
10
Id.; see also Ben Brody, Republican Senator Slams Conservative Tech Lobbyists to Their Faces,
PROTOCOL (June 22, 2021), https://www.protocol.com/mike-lee-netchoice-antitrust (discussing Senator Mike Lee’s
concerns about Big Tech).
11
Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); see also Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc. 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1218 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If
the majority is worried about monopolization, it ought to consider whether Google is the greater threat.”).
6
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Concerns about Big Tech are not confined to elites. The concerns among
average Americans manifest themselves in different ways to different groups.12
Traditional conservatives are deeply concerned about Big Tech’s ideological
bias and ability to silence conservative voices.13 Liberals are troubled by Big
Tech’s misinformation and political power to sway elections.14 Parents are
gravely concerned about Big Tech’s influence on their children, which heightens
their addiction, isolation, and depression.15 Consumers are troubled by the
invasion of their privacy and the leveraging of their personal data to line the
pockets of Silicon Valley giants earning hundreds of billions in advertising
revenue.16 Small town newspapers and their readers are concerned about news
deserts and the death of traditional journalism.17 Community leaders lament the
demise of traditional retail stores and the jobs they sustained.18 Almost everyone
recognizes that Big Tech coarsens our public discourse and promotes political
division.19 Regardless of one’s race, gender, geography, or political persuasion,
12
See Megan Brenan, Views of Big Tech Worsen; Public Wants More Regulation, GALLUP (Feb. 18,
2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/329666/views-big-tech-worsen-public-wants-regulation.aspx.
13
See REPUBLICAN STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., REINING IN BIG TECH’S
CENSORSHIP OF CONSERVATIVES 1, 4–5, 27 (Oct. 6, 2020), (arguing that Big Tech companies such as Facebook,
Amazon, Google, YouTube, and Twitter are biased against conservatives and that Congress needs to take action
to prevent these companies from engaging in censorship, discrimination, and content moderation); Senator Mike
Lee, Sen. Mike Lee: Big Tech Companies Falsely Claim No Bias Against Conservatives—They May Be Violating
the Law, FOX NEWS (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/big-teach-bias-conservatives-sen-mikelee (arguing that censorship and content moderation on social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter have
unfairly targeted and biased conservative ideologies); Chris Talgo, Big Tech’s Assault on Free Speech, THE HILL
(Aug. 4, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/510367-big-techs-assault-on-free-speech (discussing how major
Big Tech companies sensor conservative ideologies through “shadow bans” or filtered searches favoring “left”
views).
14
See SALLY HUBBARD, MONOPOLIES SUCK: 7 WAYS BIG CORPORATIONS RULE YOUR LIFE AND HOW
TO TAKE BACK CONTROL 134–52 (2020).
15
See THE SOCIAL DILEMMA (Exposure Labs, Argent Pictures & The Space Program 2020).
16
See Public Opinion on Privacy, EPIC (Apr. 27, 2021), https://epic.org/privacy/survey/.
17
See generally PENELOPE MUSE ABERNATHY, NEWS DESERTS AND GHOST NEWSPAPERS: WILL LOCAL
NEWS SURVIVE? 1, 9, 11–18 (2020) (discussing the harmful impact due to the rapid decline in local news and
suggesting potential solutions).
18
See generally Stacy Mitchell, The Impact of Chain Stores on Community, INST. FOR LOCAL SELFRELIANCE (Apr. 18, 2000), https://ilsr.org/impact-chain-stores-community/ (discussing the impact of chain retail
stores on communities and how some community leaders have adopted policies that prioritize the development
of local independent businesses); Philip Mattera, Fighting Chain Stores Past and Present: The Roots of the
Campaign Against Wal-Mart, CORP. RSCH. PROJECT (Aug. 2005), https://www.corp-research.org/e-letter/
fighting-chains-stores-past-and-present (discussing the anti-chain movement); Brandi Calero-Holmes, What It
Really Costs When Walmart Comes to Town, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Dec. 1, 2021), https://www.businessnewsdaily.
com/2405-real-cost-walmart.html (explaining that large retail chains like Wal-Mart pay lower wages for their
employees and drive out local businesses, which negatively affects local economies).
19
See Clara Hendrickson & William A. Galston, Big Tech Threats: Making Sense of the Backlash Against
Online Platforms, BROOKINGS (May 28, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/big-tech-threats-makingsense-of-the-backlash-against-online-platforms/; Cory Doctorow, How Big Tech Monopolies Distort Our Public
Discourse, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 28, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/how-big-tech-
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the vast majority of Americans believe that Big Tech companies are simply too
big and too powerful.20
Despite these grave misgivings about Big Tech, the irony is that we all use
their products and services on a daily basis.21 We even recognize that Big Tech
provides significant value to the average consumer.22 In other words, our
relationship with Big Tech is complicated. One can take a variety of perspectives
on Big Tech that may appear to be contradictory. But a nuanced approach
recognizes that one can have complex opinions about Big Tech. As Senator Lee
put it, “Big Tech isn’t always bad, but neither is it always good.”23
One could say that we have cognitive dissonance about Big Tech. Under
cognitive dissonance theory, when we engage in behavior that is inconsistent
with our beliefs, we experience an unpleasant psychological tension—
dissonance—which we are motivated to reduce.24 Our behavior in using Big
Tech’s products and services is inconsistent with our knowledge about Big
Tech’s abuse of power, and therefore we have complex feelings of dissonance
when we use monopoly products that we know are useful at one level but also
harmful to us, our children, and society. The problem is that Big Tech’s
monopoly power makes it difficult to meaningfully choose alternatives to avoid
the cognitive dissonance.25
This Article outlines four views about Big Tech and suggests that one can
be in agreement with all four superficially contradictory propositions. One can
recognize and affirm the following: (1) Big Tech provides valuable services; (2)
Big Tech is too powerful; (3) current antitrust laws are inadequate to address
Big Tech’s power; and (4) Big Tech is abusing its monopoly power and violating
existing antitrust laws. In fact, I would suggest that, regardless of political

monopolies-distort-our-public-discourse.
20
See infra Part II.
21
See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, I Tried to Live Without the Tech Giants. It Was Impossible., N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/technology/blocking-the-tech-giants.html (finding that it
was impossible to operate on a daily basis without relying on and using Big Tech products).
22
See Christopher Koopman, CGO Tech Poll, CTR. FOR GROWTH & OPPORTUNITY (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.thecgo.org/research/tech-poll/.
23
NetChoice, supra note 9.
24
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–3, 9–11 (Stanford Univ. Press 1962).
25
Doctorow, supra note 19.
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persuasion, many of us maintain precisely those four propositions
simultaneously. We are in the middle of the Venn diagram below.

We are in the midst of one of the most polarizing and divisive periods in our
nation’s history—a division that Big Tech exacerbates and exploits to its
advantage.26 Yet, “there is one issue the left and right can agree on”: the perils
of Big Tech and the desperate need to do something about it.27 The perspective
that Big Tech is a force that is uniquely deleterious to a healthy body politic is a
view shared by conservatives and liberals alike.28
Part I of this Article recognizes the valuable services that Big Tech provides.
Part II summarizes surveys demonstrating the public perception that Big Tech
companies are too powerful. Part III explores, in some detail, the numerous
bipartisan congressional proposals that have been introduced in recent months,
26
Id. (discussing how Big Tech companies create bigger divides in public discourse through surveillance
and data collection to manipulate users).
27
Matt Stoller, The One Issue the Left and Right Can Agree On, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 31, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/152680/one-issue-left-right-can-agree.
28
Kara Frederick, Combating Big Tech’s Totalitarianism: A Road Map, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 7,
2022), https://www.heritage.org/technology/report/combating-big-techs-totalitarianism-road-map; KLOBUCHAR,
supra note 7, at 315–16; TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 21–22 (2018).
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recognizing that antitrust laws are inadequate to deal with the abuse of Big
Tech’s power. Finally, Part IV outlines the numerous lawsuits that federal and
state antitrust enforcers have brought in the past year, reflecting the bipartisan
consensus that Google and Facebook are violating existing antitrust laws. Given
the variety and complexity of proposed solutions, this Article focuses on the
legislative and litigation efforts to combat Big Tech’s abuse of power.
I.

BIG TECH PROVIDES VALUABLE SERVICES

There is no doubt that Big Tech companies, including Facebook, Amazon,
Google, Apple, and even Twitter, provide valuable services to consumers around
the world. Big Tech companies connect people, provide ready access to
information, create platforms for small businesses and consumers to buy and sell
goods, and offer tools to simplify our lives in innumerable ways.29 Big Tech has
also served an invaluable role in accelerating globalization and economic
development.30 The general public recognizes that these companies provide
goods and services that improve their lives on a regular basis.31
Big Tech products and services are ubiquitous. As of 2018, eighty-one
percent of Americans have a Google account, seventy-six percent have an
Amazon account, seventy percent have a Facebook account, and sixty-four
percent own an Apple product.32 Nearly all Americans rely on Big Tech every
day to optimize their lives. According to a survey by the conservative nonprofit
Center for Growth and Opportunity,33 the average American recognizes the
benefits of technological innovation.34 Another survey showed that sixty percent
of Americans somewhat or completely agree that their professional lives have
29
See Om Malik, Apple, Google, Amazon, and the Advantages of Bigness, NEW YORKER (Aug. 9, 2016)
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/apple-google-amazon-and-the-advantages-of-bigness.
30
See, e.g., In Poor Countries Technology Can Make Big Improvements to Education, ECONOMIST
(Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.economist.com/international/2018/11/17/in-poor-countries-technology-can-make-bigimprovements-to-education (discussing the benefits of technology on education in developing countries).
31
See Koopman, supra note 22.
32
Samuel Chamberlain, New Poll Details Voters’ Distrust of Big Tech, Big Government, N.Y. POST
(June 26, 2021), https://nypost.com/2021/06/26/new-poll-details-voters-distrust-of-big-tech-big-government/;
Steve Liesman, America Loves Its Apple. Poll Finds that the Average Household Owns More than Two Apple
Products, CNBC (Oct. 10, 2017, 9:49 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/09/the-average-american-householdowns-more-than-two-apple-products.html.
33
The Center for Growth and Opportunity is funded by the Charles Koch Foundation. Mark Hand, New
Center Stokes Fears that Utah University is Becoming ‘Koch U’ of the West, THINKPROGRESS (May 1, 2018),
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/koch-funded-academics-join-utah-state-university-center-de592401959e/. For
information on the Charles Koch Foundation, see About Us, CHARLES KOCH FOUND., https://
charleskochfoundation.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2022).
34
See Koopman, supra note 22 (finding that, on average, most Americans believe that their personal lives
and professional lives have been improved by technological innovation).
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been improved by technological innovation.35 That percentage increased to
seventy-six percent when asked whether their personal lives have been improved
by technological innovation.36 Regardless of party affiliation, the vast majority
of consumers recognize that technological innovations have improved their
personal and professional lives.37
Even Big Tech’s harshest critics recognize that Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
and Google “play an important role in our economy and society as the
underlying infrastructure for the exchange of communications, information, and
goods and services.”38 The ubiquity of Big Tech’s presence in our lives
underscores its potential to impact the lives of every American, for good and for
ill.39 As Representative David Cicilline argued, “Any single action by one of
these companies can affect hundreds of millions of us in profound and lasting
ways.”40
Trade associations funded by Big Tech have seized upon the benefits we
enjoy from technological innovation to argue that reforms are unnecessary and
counterproductive. For example, NetChoice argues that proposed legislation is
“Anti-American” because it would “take away connection, innovation, and
opportunity, hurting Americans in all areas of their lives.”41 According to
NetChoice, “Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google . . . deliver more and more
benefits to consumers. And despite rhetoric to the contrary, none engages in
unlawful conduct.”42 Of course, it is a non sequitur to say that because these
companies provide valuable services, their conduct is beyond reproach. Nor does
it follow that the status quo is the most conducive environment to promote
further innovation.
One can recognize that Big Tech companies provide valuable services while
also recognizing that they are too powerful and in need of reform. No one would

35

See id.
Id.
37
Id.
38
MAJORITY STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 1, 10 (2020) [hereinafter
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION].
39
David McCabe & Cecilia Kang, Lawmakers from Both Sides Take Aim at Big Tech Executives, N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/07/29/technology/tech-ceos-hearing-testimony.
40
Id.
41
NETCHOICE, NEW ANTITRUST BILLS ARE ANTI-AMERICAN 1 (2021), https://netchoice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/FINAL-NetChoice_Mocks_6.17.21.pdf.
42
NETCHOICE, AGGRESSIVE COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS: PROOF OUR ANTITRUST LAWS
WORK 41 (2020), https://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/NetChoice-Response-to-House-AntitrustHearing.pdf.
36
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suggest, for example, that by producing, refining, and marketing oil that was in
high demand at the turn of the twentieth century, Standard Oil was therefore
absolved of its misconduct.43 As Ida Tarbell noted in her history of Standard Oil,
“the whole world was crying” for Standard Oil products. According to Tarbell,
“Petroleum came at the moment when the value and necessity of a new, cheap
light [oil] was recogni[z]ed everywhere.”44 But despite the insatiable demand
for cheap oil, the Supreme Court ordered the breakup of Standard Oil in 1911.45
Monopolists can satisfy intense consumer demand and abuse their market power
at the same time.
II. BIG TECH IS TOO POWERFUL
There is a broad consensus in the United States that Big Tech companies are
too powerful and abuse their market power.46 As one commentator noted, “The
concern that Big Tech has too much power is a theme that resounds strongly
across the political spectrum.”47 These concerns are shared by lawmakers from
both political parties who agree that these companies wield too much power and
limit competition.48 Digital markets are highly concentrated, with many
markets—social media, search advertising, display advertising, app stores—
being controlled by one or two competitors.49 The laundry list of anticompetitive
practices continues to grow, as these companies consistently use their dominant
positions to control multiple segments of various technology markets.50

43

See IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 285 (Peter Smith 1963) (1904).
Id.
45
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81–82 (1911).
46
See Chris Raymond, Americans Say Nation’s Big Tech Companies Have Too Much Power, CONSUMER
REP. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-protection/big-tech-companies-have-too-muchpower-americans-say/ (finding that three in four Americans “worry about the power wielded by today’s biggest
tech platforms”); Consumers Feel Big Tech Companies Have Too Much Power and Require More Stringent
Regulation, BUS. WIRE (June 29, 2021, 10:23 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/202106290057
91/en/Consumers-Feel-Big-Tech-Companies-Have-Too-Much-Power-and-Require-More-Stringent-Regulation
(“Nearly two-thirds of consumers in the United States feel big tech companies wield too much power . . . .”).
47
Gavin Bridge, Republicans, Democrats United in Concern over Big Tech: Survey, VARIETY (Aug. 4,
2021), https://variety.com/vip/republicans-democrats-united-in-concern-over-big-tech-survey-1235033853/ (finding
that, in response to the question, “Do you think Big Tech has too much power over consumers?”, seventy percent
of respondents said yes—seventy-seven percent of Republicans, sixty-nine percent of Independents, and sixtyseven percent of Democrats).
48
Alex Sherman, U.S. Lawmakers Agree Big Tech Has Too Much Power, but What to Do About It
Remains a Mystery, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/30/us-lawmakers-agree-big-tech-has-toomuch-power-remedies-unclear.html (July 30, 2020, 2:29 PM).
49
See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION, supra note 38, at 11.
50
Id.
44
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Likewise, consumers recognize the value of Big Tech products, but they also
have grave misgivings about the companies themselves. One poll indicated that
seventy percent of Americans believe technology companies are too big.51
Americans’ trust in Big Tech has declined significantly, especially among
Republicans and Independents.52 Just two years ago, Americans’ impressions of
Big Tech was a net positive of six points from Republicans, ten points from
Independents, and twenty from Democrats.53 Today, the same poll produced
results of net negative forty-five for Republicans, negative eleven for
Independents, and positive nineteen for Democrats.54 Other polls have found
that the majority of Americans across the political spectrum think that the
government should increase regulation of Big Tech companies.55
Moreover, on key issues, concerns about Big Tech do not break down on
partisan lines. A recent Ipsos poll found that sixty-seven percent of Republicans
and sixty-five percent of Democrats support “[b]reaking up large, monopolistic,
technology companies.”56 Seventy-six percent of Democrats and seventy-five
percent of Republicans support “[m]aking it harder for large companies to
establish monopolies through acquiring competitor companies.”57 In other
words, the overwhelming majority of Americans across the political spectrum
support measures to prevent Big Tech companies from acquiring or maintaining
their monopoly status.
The reputations of Big Tech companies have plummeted in recent years.
Five years ago, Google was ranked among the top ten U.S. companies.58 Today,
it no longer ranks in the top fifty.59 In fact, according to Axios/Harris, no
51
Ashley Gold, Conservatives Aim to Cool GOP’s Newfound Antitrust Fervor, AXIOS (July 29, 2020),
https://www.axios.com/conservatives-aim-to-cool-gops-newfound-antitrust-fervor-32aa023a-6601-4201-8002a7cce6d84444.html.
52
See Brenan, supra note 12.
53
Id.
54
See id.
55
Id.; Emily A. Vogels, 56% of Americans Support More Regulation of Major Technology Companies,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 20, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/07/20/56-of-americans-supportmore-regulation-of-major-technology-companies/.
56
What Tech Executives Should Know in Today’s Polarized Society, IPSOS (Feb. 14, 2022), https://www.
ipsos.com/en-us/knowledge/society/what-tech-executives-should-know-in-todays-polarized-society.
57
Id.
58
See Alanna Petroff, The 10 Most Valuable Brands of 2016, CNN BUS. (June 7, 2016, 8:49 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/gallery/news/companies/2016/06/07/google-most-valuable-brands/index.html.
59
Sara Fischer & Danielle Alberti, A Divided Nation Flocks to Partisan Brands, AXIOS (May 13, 2021),
https://www.axios.com/brands-politics-patagonia-trump-mypillow-4391077e-f74e-4b97-a509-384730349aae.
html; Sara Fischer & Scott Rosenberg, Big Tech’s Reputation Takes a Pandemic Plunge, AXIOS (May 13, 2021),
https://www.axios.com/tech-firms-reputation-pandemic-plunge-78685c5f-7238-491c-b955-70e98083852d.
html.
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company’s reputation has fallen further than Google’s in the past year, falling
thirty-six places.60 Google has received particularly low marks regarding its
reputation for ethics and citizenship.61 Even worse are Facebook and Twitter,
which rank near the very bottom of the Axios/Harris poll of the reputation of
technology companies.62 Of the Big Tech companies, respondents identified
only one company—Amazon—as having an excellent reputation.63
Americans are deeply skeptical about Big Tech’s role with respect to
privacy. According to Pew Research Center, four out of five Americans say they
have little or no control over the data collected about them by technology
companies and that the potential risks outweigh the benefits when it comes to
technology companies collecting personal data.64
As for Big Tech’s role in politics, almost three out of four Americans state
that “they are not too or not at all confident in technology companies to prevent
misuses of their platforms to influence the 2020 presidential election.”65
Seventy-three percent of Americans agree that “it’s likely that social media sites
intentionally censor political viewpoints they find objectionable,” while sixtysix percent have “not too much or no confidence” in technology companies
labeling such posts “as inaccurate or misleading.”66
Given that the vast majority of Americans have expressed concern about the
Big Tech’s abuse of their power, there is an emerging recognition that something
drastic must be done. Public concern about Big Tech translates into political
momentum to address the problem. The impetus for reform comes in two forms:
legislation and litigation. Notably absent in the current political environment is
the traditional answer that these monopolies are fragile or that Big Tech markets
are competitive.

60
AXIOS & THE HARRIS POLL, 2021 AXIOS HARRIS POLL 100, at 14 (2021), https://theharrispoll.com/
axios-harrispoll-100/.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Brooke Auxier & Lee Raine, Key Takeaways on Americans’ Views About Privacy, Surveillance and
Data Sharing, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/15/key-takeawayson-americans-views-about-privacy-surveillance-and-data-sharing/.
65
Brooke Auxier, How Americans See U.S. Tech Companies as Government Scrutiny Increases, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/27/how-americans-see-u-s-techcompanies-as-government-scrutiny-increases/.
66
Id.
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III. CURRENT LAWS ARE INADEQUATE TO CURB BIG TECH
In recent years, the U.S. Congress has taken a particular interest in
addressing the power of Big Tech companies such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
and Google.67 Both Democrats and Republicans agree that Big Tech companies
are too powerful, that they abuse that power to harm competition, and that
stronger oversight of Big Tech companies is essential.68
Under the Biden administration, antitrust enforcement is a key priority and
leaders from the progressive wing of the Democratic party are now in positions
of leadership. The choice of Tim Wu as Special Assistant to the President for
Technology and Competition Policy,69 Lina Khan as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) chair,70 and Jonathan Kanter as the Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust at the Department of Justice (DOJ)71 suggests that antitrust
leadership under the Biden administration will be far more aggressive than
antitrust leadership under previous recent Democratic administrations. In
addition, Congress has aggressive leadership in Senator Amy Klobuchar, Chair
of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Competition Policy,
Antitrust, and Consumer Rights, as well as Representative David Cicilline, Chair
of the House Judiciary Committee’s Antitrust Subcommittee.72 These executive
and congressional leaders portend an aggressive, neo-Brandeisian antitrust
agenda in the coming years that is deeply skeptical of Big Tech.
Likewise, many Republicans have taken an approach of favoring stricter
enforcement.73 This is in contrast to a traditionally cautious Republican
approach on antitrust enforcement and longstanding Republican opposition to

67

See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION, supra note 38, at 11.
See Brenan, supra note 12.
69
Cecilia Kang, A Leading Critic of Big Tech Will Join the White House, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/technology/tim-wu-white-house.html.
70
Cecilia Kang, Biden Nominates Lina Khan, A Vocal Critic of Big Tech, to the F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/business/lina-khan-ftc.html.
71
Ankush Khardori, It Took Forever to Get Confirmed. Now All He Has to Do Is Fix All of Antitrust Law,
POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/12/14/antitrust-enforcement-obstacleskanter-justice-department-524187.
72
See Ben Brody, The Senate is Ready to Take on Big Tech Competition Now, PROTOCOL (Oct. 14, 2021),
https://www.protocol.com/policy/senate-antitrust-bill; Cristiano Lima, Why 2022 Could be a Watershed Year
for Tech Regulation, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2022, 8:55 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/
01/03/why-2022-could-be-watershed-year-tech-regulation/; Leah Nylen, The New Rules of Monopoly, POLITICO
(Dec. 27, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/27/monopoly-antitrust-new-rules-tech-525161. See
generally KLOBUCHAR, supra note 7 (discussing the history of antitrust in the United States and recommending
ways to improve competition enforcement).
73
Nylen, supra note 72.
68
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increased government regulation.74 Republican antitrust leadership in Congress,
particularly by Representative Ken Buck, Ranking Minority Member of the
House Judiciary Committee’s Antitrust Subcommittee, Senator Mike Lee,
Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on
Competition Policy, Antitrust, and Consumer Rights, and Senator Josh Hawley,
a leading conservative critic of Big Tech, has scrambled the traditional antitrust
policy positions on Capitol Hill.75 Although several coalitions with deep pocket
donors (particularly Big Tech donors) have attempted to counter this trend,76 the
bipartisan effort to curb Big Tech continues to rise.77
Republicans and Democrats have found agreement in supporting certain
types of antitrust action, with Republicans scrutinizing potential anticonservative censorship, Democrats expressing concern over Big Tech’s failure
to curtail hate speech and misinformation, and both Republicans and Democrats
being deeply suspicious of technology companies’ size and power.78 Several
congressional committees have taken action to bring the greater oversight of Big
Tech to the forefront of their antitrust agenda.
Recently, the House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee, led by
Representative Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary,
completed a sixteen-month investigation of the market dominance of Big Tech
companies and released a document with recommendations that totaled over 400
pages.79 Inside the report, Representative Cicilline stated the following:
[C]ompanies that once were scrappy, underdog startups that
challenged the status quo have become the kinds of monopolies we
last saw in the era of oil barons and railroad tycoons . . . . These firms
have too much power, and that power must be reined in and subject to
74

Brenan, supra note 12.
See Nylen, supra note 72; Brody, supra note 72; Maggie Miller, Hawley Introduces Legislation
Targeting Amazon, Google Antitrust Concerns, THE HILL (Apr. 19, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/
technology/548930-hawley-introduces-legislation-targeting-amazon-google-antitrust-concerns; Nancy Scola,
The Congressman Who Doesn’t Use Google, POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/
news/magazine/2021/12/20/ken-buck-congressman-google-525282; JOSH HAWLEY, THE TYRANNY OF BIG
TECH (2021).
76
See Find Out Which Groups Get Big Tech Funding, TECH TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (Aug. 10, 2021),
https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/find-out-which-groups-get-big-tech-funding.
77
Nylen, supra note 72.
78
Brenan, supra note 12; Tal Axelrod, Views of Big Tech Firms Worsen Over Past 18 Months: Poll, THE
HILL (Feb. 18, 2021, 9:22 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/539367-views-of-big-tech-firms-worsenover-past-18-months-poll.
79
See generally Press Release, House Comm. on Judiciary, Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee
Investigation Reveals Digital Economy Highly Concentrated, Impacted by Monopoly Power (Oct. 6, 2020)
(available at https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3429) (investigating state of
digital economy with recommendations for reform).
75

ALFORD_5.20.22

906

5/25/2022 1:24 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

appropriate oversight and enforcement. Our economy and democracy
are at stake.80

In response, several Republican members on the committee, led by
Congressman Ken Buck, released “The Third Way.”81 Congressman Buck’s
approach reflects the views of many Republicans, historically skeptical of
changing the antitrust laws but increasingly open to the idea after detailed
investigations of Big Tech’s abuse of power.82 Although the Republican
minority report disagrees with some recommendations made in the majority
report, it highlights the bipartisan consensus that Congress must address Big
Tech’s abuse of power.83 It stated that these companies’ “behaviors are the fruit
of Big Tech’s poisonous and monopolistic tree. . . . [W]e agree that we can and
must address the challenges posed by Big Tech’s monopolistic control of the
digital economy.”84
The House Antitrust Subcommittee has held several hearings to address Big
Tech anticompetitive conduct, notably including testimony from the CEOs of
Amazon, Apple, Google and Facebook.85 Likewise in the Senate, Senators
Klobuchar and Lee have conducted numerous hearings involving Big Tech’s
abuse of power.86 The tenor of these hearings reflects strong bipartisan hostility
80

INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION, supra note 38, at 6–7.
KEN BUCK, THE THIRD WAY 7 (2020), https://buck.house.gov/sites/buck.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_
uploaded/Buck%20Report.pdf.
82
Gold, supra note 51.
83
BUCK, supra note 81, at 2 (“Since June 2019, the Chairman has delivered on his promise to conduct a
bipartisan, top-to-bottom review of the anticompetitive behavior in the technology marketplace, including
examining the monopolistic business practices of tech’s titans—Apple, Amazon, Google, and Facebook. We
write this response to join Chairman Cicilline and the majority staff on certain recommendations, offer
modifications to some recommendations, and argue against the wisdom of proceeding on a few
recommendations.”).
84
Id. at 6–7.
85
See Online Platforms and Marker Power, Part 1: The Free and Diverse Press, H. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY (June 11, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2260;
Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 2: Innovation and Entrepreneurship, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY
(July 16, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2258; Online Platforms and
Market Power, Part 3: The Role of Data and Privacy in Competition, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (Sept. 12,
2019, 1:00 PM), https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2294; Online Platforms and
Market Power, Part 4: Perspectives of the Antitrust Agencies, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (Nov. 13, 2019,
7:00 PM), https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2287; Field Hearing: Online
Platforms and Market Power, Part 5: Competitors in the Digital Economy, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (Jan.
17, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2386; Online Platforms
and Market Power, Part 6: Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google, H. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY (July 29, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID
=3113.
86
Subcommittee on Competition Policy, Antitrust, and Consumer Rights, COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/subcommittees/subcommittee-on-antitrust-competition-policy-and81
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toward Big Tech’s business practices, suggesting widespread political support
for more aggressive legislative action.87
In the wake of these legislative reports and hearings, the House and Senate
antitrust leaders have introduced several bills to strengthen the antitrust laws to
address Big Tech’s abuse of power.88 Many of these bills have significant
Democratic and Republican support.89 Based on the reports, hearings, and
legislative proposals in Congress, there is now clear bipartisan agreement among
many congressional leaders that companies like Apple, Amazon, Google, and
Facebook have engaged in anticompetitive conduct that necessitates further
legislative action.90 Both political parties frequently frame Big Tech as having a
“monopolization” of the marketplace.91
The essence of these concerns is that Big Tech companies have market
power that they abuse through anticompetitive conduct that discourages new
entrants, diminishes quality, increases prices, reduces output, and stifles
innovation. As President Biden stated in an Executive Order to promote
competition, “The American information technology sector has long been an
engine of innovation and growth, but today a small number of dominant internet
platforms use their power to exclude market entrants, to extract monopoly
profits, and to gather intimate personal information that they can exploit for their
own advantage.”92

consumer-rights (last visited Apr. 27, 2022).
87
Anna Edgerton, Unlikely Senate Alliance of Amy Klobuchar, Mike Lee Paints a Bull’s-Eye on Big Tech,
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/technology/unlikely-senate-alliance-of-klobuchar-leepaints-a-bulls-eye-on-big-tech// (May 17, 2021, 6:38 PM); see also Cecilia Kang & David McCabe, Antitrust
Overhaul Passes Its Final Tests. Now, the Hard Parts, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/
technology/antitrust-overhaul-congress.html (June 29, 2021) (discussing difficulties in the House and Senate to
secure final passage of antitrust bills).
88
JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46875, THE BIG TECH ANTITRUST BILLS 2, 8, 11, 14 (2021).
89
Ryan Tracy & John McKinnon, Antitrust Tech Bills Gain Bipartisan Momentum in Senate, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 25, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/antitrust-tech-bills-gain-bipartisan-momentum-in-senate-11637
836202.
90
See Press Release, Ken Buck, Rep., House of Rep., Representative Buck Pens Antitrust Report that
Presents a “Third Way” to Take on Big Tech (Oct. 6, 2020) (available at https://buck.house.gov/media-center/
press-releases/rep-buck-pens-antitrust-report-presents-third-way-take-big-tech); Christopher Mims, Republicans and
Democrats Find a Point of Agreement: Big Tech Is Too Powerful, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/
republicans-and-democrats-find-a-point-of-agreement-big-tech-is-too-powerful-11596118625 (July 30,
2020, 10:49 AM).
91
BUCK, supra note 81, at 3.
92
Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021).
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A. Stronger Antitrust Enforcement
The first legislative proposal enjoying strong bipartisan support aims to
provide more resources for stronger antitrust enforcement.93 In the House, the
Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act increases merger fees paid to enforcement
agencies for merger filings, with the goal of then distributing more resources to
the FTC and DOJ.94 This bill, pending a full House vote, serves as companion
legislation to a portion of the Senate U.S. Innovation and Competition Act,
which also includes this proposal and has passed the Senate.95 Co-sponsored by
Chairwoman Klobuchar and Senator Grassley, the bill includes changes to premerger notifications, increases filing fees for large mergers, and reduces the fees
for smaller mergers.96
Reforms to the merger filing fees are long overdue. The merger filing-fee
structure has not been modified since 2001.97 Consequently, “midsize deals
provide a disproportionate amount of the funding, but large deals (more than $5
billion) trigger a disproportionate percentage of antitrust investigation.”98
Further, the legislation is attractive because it will significantly increase
enforcement agency resources without negatively impacting American
taxpayers.99 Such a proposal is among the least controversial proposals in the
package of antitrust legislative reforms.

93
Cecilia Kang & David McCabe, House Lawmakers Are Considering Six Bills Aimed at Big Tech, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/23/technology/big-tech-antitrust-bills.html.
94
Adam Kovacevich, Regulating Big Tech: Should Congress Pass the Most Sweeping Antitrust Bills in
Generations? | Pro/Con, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 1, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/news/congress-antitrustbig-tech-mary-gay-scanlon-20210701.html; Rachel Lerman, Big Tech Antitrust Bills Pass First Major Hurdle
in House Even as Opposition Grows, WASH. POST (June 24, 2021, 3:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2021/06/24/tech-antitrust-bills-pass-house-committee/; Lauren Feiner, Lawmakers Unveil Major
Bipartisan Antitrust Reforms that Could Reshape Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google, CNBC, https://www.
cnbc.com/2021/06/11/amazon-apple-facebook-and-google-targeted-in-bipartisan-antitrust-reform-bills.html.
(Dec. 13, 2021, 1:35 PM)
95
Thomas Franck, Senate Passes $250 Billion Bipartisan Tech and Manufacturing Bill Aimed at
Countering China, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/08/senate-passes-bipartisan-tech-and-manufacturing-billaimed-at-china.html (June 9, 2021, 11:13 AM); Ben Brody, Bipartisan Merger Fee Bill Heads to Senate Floor,
PROTOCOL (May 13, 2021), protocol.com/merger-fee-senate.
96
Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2021, S. 228, 117th Cong. (“Ordered to be reported without
amendment favorably.”).
97
See Press Release, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Grassley, Klobuchar Bill to Ensure Antitrust Authorities
Have Resources to Protect Consumers Unanimously Passes Out of Committee (May 13, 2021) (available at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/grassley-klobuchar-bill-to-ensure-antitrust-authoritieshave-resources-to-protect-consumers-unanimously-passes-out-of-committee).
98
Michael Kades, The State of U.S. Federal Antitrust Enforcement, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH
(Sept. 17, 2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/the-state-of-u-s-federal-antitrust-enforcement/?longform=
true.
99
Press Release, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 97.

ALFORD_5.20.22

2022]

5/25/2022 1:24 PM

BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS ON BIG TECH

909

Closely related to the merger bill is the State Antitrust Enforcement Venue
Act, which would strengthen state enforcement of federal antitrust laws.100 The
bill has broad bipartisan support, clearing the House Judiciary Committee by a
vote of thirty-four to seven,101 and the Senate Judiciary Committee by an
overwhelming voice vote.102 The bill would grant state attorneys general the
same power as federal enforcers to choose the venue for pursuing antitrust
litigation without the risk of transfer and consolidation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407.103 The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) endorsed the
bill with a letter signed by fifty-two state and territory attorneys general
expressing “strong support” for passing the legislation “as soon as possible so
that our citizens can benefit from efficient, effective, and timely adjudication of
antitrust actions.”104
The problems with the existing laws are readily apparent, with a multidistrict
panel in Texas v. Google recently granting Google’s request to transfer and
consolidate the complaint of the state attorneys general with private antitrust
cases after a federal district court already had rejected Google’s motion to
transfer the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.105 The multidistrict panel
completely ignored the severe delays that would result from such consolidation
and the sovereign interests at stake in the litigation.106 The proposed venue

100
State Antitrust Enforcement Venue Act of 2021, H.R. 3460, S.1787, 117th Cong. (2021) (aiming to
strengthen state enforcement by “prevent[ing] the transfer of [antitrust] actions . . . in which a State is a
complainant”).
101
Five of the seven dissenting votes in the House Judiciary Committee came from the California
delegation that is more likely beholden to Big Tech’s political and financial influence. See Roll Call Vote of
H.R. 3460 (June 23, 2021) (dissenting votes from Zoe Lofgren (CA-19), Eric Swalwell (CA-15), Lou Correa
(CA-46), Darrell Issa (CA-50), Tom McClintock (CA-04), Thomas Massie (KY-04), Michelle Fischbach (MN07)).
102
Press Release, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Senate Judiciary Committee Advances Latest Slate of
Nominations and Legislation (Sept. 23, 2021) (available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/dem/releases/
senate-judiciary-committee-advances-latest-slate-of-nominations-and-legislation) (“S. 1787, the State Antitrust
Enforcement Venue Act of 2021 . . . advanced out of Committee by voice vote.”).
103
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(g).
104
National Association of Attorneys General, Support for the State Antitrust Enforcement Venue Act of
2021 (June 18, 2021), https://1li23g1as25g1r8so11ozniw-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/
06/Final-State-Antitrust-Enforcement-Venue-Act-Endorsement.pdf.
105
Texas v. Google LLC, No. 4:20-CV-957, 2021 WL 2043184, at *10 (May 20, 2021).
106
In re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litigation, 555 F. Supp. 3d 1372 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2021).
In the Order, the panel said that “[w]e recognize the states’ concerns regarding potential delay from centralization
with putative class actions. But these are essentially case management concerns appropriate to raise with the
transferee court for resolution.” Id. at 1378. It also stated that “[t]he state plaintiffs’ status as sovereigns does
not weigh against inclusion of their action. . . . [T]he states’ arguments to exclude their action rely in large part
on proposed legislation that, if enacted, would effectuate that desired outcome. However, we must apply the law
currently in effect, without speculating about what future legislation might be passed.” Id. at 1378–79. A proper
recognition of the states’ sovereign interests would have excluded the states from the consolidation altogether
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legislation will prevent the delay and forum shopping tactics of Big Tech
companies in the future and have the effect of remanding the Texas v. Google
case to the federal court chosen by the seventeen state attorneys general.107
A third proposal for stronger antitrust enforcement is additional federal and
state funding. Senator Klobuchar has introduced legislation proposing dramatic
increases in funding for the DOJ and the FTC.108 Under the proposed legislation,
the DOJ Antitrust Division budget would increase from $184 million in 2021 to
$484 million in 2022, an increase of 164%. Similarly, under the proposed
legislation, the FTC’s budget would increase from $351 million in 2021 to $651
million in 2022, an increase of 85%.109
Additional funding for state attorneys general is also under consideration,
with an NAAG letter signed by forty-five state attorneys general proposing
federal funding to support state litigation against Big Tech companies. The letter
stated that “antitrust policy is at a pivotal moment, and . . . [a]t the forefront of
this consensus is Big Tech[,] where we are confronted daily with the effects of
extreme concentrations of market power amassed by firms in technology
industries.”110
These proposals are in the early stages, but given the widespread bipartisan
agreement that more vigorous enforcement against Big Tech is necessary,
funding in support of such state and federal enforcement seems warranted.

or, at a minimum, consolidated the cases in the sovereign states’ chosen forum of the Eastern District of Texas.
Id. at 1375.
107
State Antitrust Enforcement Venue Act of 2021, H.R. 3460, S.1787, 117th Cong. (2021). The proposed
legislation would be effective on June 1, 2021, with the effect that any action in which a state is a complainant
would be remanded to the original district court from which it was transferred. Id.
108
Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225 § 15, 117th Cong. (2021). As
part of the $2 trillion Build Back Better proposed legislation, the Biden administration has proposed an additional
$500 million in antitrust funding for the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and an additional $500 million
in antitrust funding for the Federal Trade Commission. The Build Back Better proposed legislation has little
Republican support. NANCY PELOSI, FACT SHEET, H.R. 5376, THE BUILD BACK BETTER ACT 13 (2021),
https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/UpdatedFact%20Sheet_TheBuild_BackBetterAct.pdf.
109
See DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION FY 2022 PERFORMANCE BUDGET
18 (2022), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1398291/download (describing budget allocation for DOJ
Antitrust Division of $184,524,000); FTC Appropriation and Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) History, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/office-executive-director/financial-managementoffice/ftc-appropriation (last visited Apr. 27, 2022).
110
Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., to Chairs Klobuchar and Cicilline & Ranking Members Lee &
Buck, Re: Enhanced State Antitrust Enforcement (May 10, 2021) (available at https://1li23g1as25g1r8so11
ozniw-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Support-for-Antitrust-Federal-Funding-FinalNAAG-Letter-2.pdf).
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B. Merger Reforms
Congressional leaders from both parties share concerns about Big Tech’s
frequent use of mergers and acquisitions to acquire and then kill competition.111
Companies engaging in this conduct may be stifling innovation by buying up
competition before a competitor becomes large enough to be a threat—conduct
commonly referred to as “buying sprees.” Estimates indicate the number of
digital platform deals in the last two decades may be over 750.112 As described
by Chairman Nadler, “In some instances these acquisitions enabled the dominant
firm to neutralize a competitive threat; in other instances, the dominant firm shut
down or discontinued the underlying product entirely—transactions aptly
described as ‘killer acquisitions.’”113
Among the more notable examples of a killer acquisition was Facebook’s
acquisition of Instagram. Emails from Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg confirm
Facebook’s intent to acquire any competitive threats.114 Mr. Zuckerberg noted
after the announcement of the Instagram acquisition that “‘[Facebook] can likely
always just buy any competitive startups.’”115 In another email, Mr. Zuckerberg
wrote, “The businesses are nascent but the networks are established, the brands
are already meaningful and if they grow to a large scale, they could be very
disruptive to us.”116 Big Tech companies recognize that early acquisitions of
potential startups are unlikely to be challenged under existing merger laws.
Such acquisitions of potential competitors may deprive users of the benefits
of competition from new and emerging entrants. For example, the FTC alleges
that Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram deprives consumers of an “additional
locus of decision-making and innovation; a check on [Facebook’s] treatment and
level of service offered to users . . . ; an alternative provider of personal social

111
BUCK, supra note 81, at 3 (“The majority staff report . . . accurately depicts the harmful effects of Big
Tech’s anticompetitive reign over the digital economy. . . . These market-dominant companies have all engaged
in myriad forms of anticompetitive behavior, including using ‘killer acquisitions’ to remove up-and-coming
competitors from the marketplace.”).
112
Id. at 9. See generally David McLaughlin, Big Tech Goes on Shopping Spree, Brushing off Antitrust
Scrutiny, FIN. POST (July 27, 2020), https://financialpost.com/technology/big-tech-goes-on-shopping-spreebrushing-off-antitrust-scrutiny (discussing the number of Big Tech acquisitions since 2015); Angus Loten, Large
Tech Companies Prepare for Acquisition Spree, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (May 21, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/large-tech-companies-prepare-for-acquisition-spree-11590053401 (discussing Big Tech acquisition in
light of market developments).
113
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION, supra note 38, at 38.
114
Complaint at 21, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-CV-3590 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021).
115
Id.
116
Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook “Destroy Mode”—Myth or Reality?, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.
com/articles/facebooks-destroy-modemyth-or-reality-11596068322 (July 29, 2020, 9:10 PM).
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networking for users untethered from Facebook’s control; and a spur for
Facebook to compete on the merits in response.”117
Congress has proposed merger reforms that would limit Big Tech’s power
to merge with actual or nascent competitors. A bipartisan bill introduced in the
House would prohibit Big Tech companies from acquiring a nascent competitor
unless the merging parties can prove that the merger would not have an adverse
effect on competition.118 Senate versions would shift the burden to the merging
parties if, among other things, the merger was valued at more than $5 billion,
the merger significantly increased market concentration, or a dominant firm
attempted to acquire a nascent competitor.119 Such mergers would be unlawful
unless the merging parties can prove that the merger does not create an
appreciable risk of materially lessening competition or tend to create a monopoly
or monopsony.120
Some argue that the risk of such proposals is that they may undermine viable
exit strategies for startups.121 Dominant firms can pay startups significant
capital, and critics fear restricting such acquisitions could dissuade venture
capitalists from investing in companies that have fewer viable exit paths.122 But
restrictions on Big Tech acquisitions are unlikely to dramatically alter the
venture capital landscape, because in the past decade their acquisitions account
for less than five percent of all tech deals in the United States.123 As Herbert
Hovenkamp noted, the legislation “wisely permits mergers to be treated as
exclusionary practices, rather than looking merely at the opportunities they
create for collusive behavior or price increases.”124
The House version of the bill has bipartisan support, clearing the House
Judiciary Committee by a vote of twenty-three to eighteen.125 The proposal has

117

Complaint at 105, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-CV-3590 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021).
Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021, H.R. 3826, 117th Cong. (2021).
119
Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225, 117th Cong. (2021);
Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021, S. 3197, 117th Cong. (2021).
120
See Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021, S. 3197, 117th Cong. (2021).
121
Lauren Feiner, Start-Ups Will Suffer from Antitrust Bills Meant to Target Big Tech, VCs Charge,
CNBC (July 24, 2021, 9:44 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/24/vcs-start-ups-will-suffer-from-antitrustbills-targeting-big-tech.html.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Herbert Hovenkamp, Congress’ Antitrust War on China and American Consumers, PROMARKET
(June 25, 2021), https://promarket.org/2021/06/25/congress-antitrust-china-consumers-merger/.
125
See Mark-Up, Comm. on the Judiciary (June 23, 2021) (available at https://docs.house.gov/Committee/
Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=112818) (H.R. 3826 agreed on roll call vote of twenty-three “ayes,” eighteen
“nos,” and one “present”).
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strong bipartisan support.126 Senator Josh Hawley has proposed similar
legislation preventing dominant firms from acquiring companies if doing so
lessens competition.127 And at the end of the Trump administration, the DOJ
endorsed proposed legislation shifting the burden of proof for firms with more
than fifty percent market share.128 Former Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division Makan Delrahim explained that, under the DOJ’s proposal,
there would be a presumption that further acquisitions would be anticompetitive
for firms with more than fifty percent market share.129 Merging parties can rebut
that presumption if they cannot exercise market power or the procompetitive
benefits outweigh the anticompetitive effects. The government would still have
the burden of defining the market and proving market shares, and then rebutting
procompetitive efficiencies.130
C. Self-Preferencing
Additional proposals aim to curb self-preferencing of Big Tech’s own
products and services over competitors on their platforms.131 A classic example
is Amazon, which hosts third-party products on its platform while also
promoting and preferencing its own competing products on the platform.
Amazon’s internal documents refer to third-party sellers utilizing their platform
as “internal competitors.”132 Empirical studies found “many instances” where
“Amazon may present itself as the default seller even when the same product is
offered at lower cost . . . with a comparable shipping speed by third-party sellers
with high ratings.”133 In other words, Amazon uses its platform power to demote
competing products that offer lower prices and higher quality.134

126
See H.R. 3826: Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.
us/congress/bills/117/hr3826 (last visited Apr. 27, 2022).
127
See Trust-Busting for the Twenty-First Century Act, S. 1074, 117th Cong. (2021).
128
Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., “A Whole New World”: An
Antitrust Entreaty for a Digital Age 5 n.2 (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1356766/
download.
129
Id. at 5.
130
Id.
131
See generally Cecilia Kang & David McCabe, Boom Time for Lawyers as Washington Pursues Big
Tech, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/29/technology/boom-times-for-lawyers-as-washingtonpursues-big-tech.html (Oct. 28, 2021) (discussing market demand for antitrust lawyers).
132
BUCK, supra note 81, at 4.
133
Feng Zhu & Kihong Liu, Competing with Complementors: An Empirical Look at Amazon.com, 39
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2618, 2637 (2018); see Randy M. Stutz, Antitrust Law and Dominant-Firm Behavior in
the Digital Technology Sector: Toward an Actionable Agenda for Policy Makers, AM. ANTITRUST INST.
(June 28, 2021), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-product/antitrust-law-and-dominant-firm-behavior-inthe-digital-technology-sector-toward-an-actionable-agenda-for-policymakers/.
134
See Zhu & Liu, supra note 133, at 2637.
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Proposals in the House and Senate would make it illegal for companies to
give preferential treatment to their own products over the products of a
competitor hosted on the same platform.135 The key objective of this legislation
is to prohibit discriminatory conduct by dominant platforms, which includes
preferencing their own services or disadvantaging the services of rivals.136 For
example, the Senate version prohibits a covered platform from engaging in
conduct that would do the following:
(1) [U]nfairly preference the covered platform’s own products,
services, or lines of business over those of another business user on the
covered platform in a manner that would materially harm competition
on the covered platform; (2) unfairly limit the ability of another
business user’s products, services, or lines of business to compete on
the covered platform relative to the covered platform operator’s own
products, services, or lines of business in a manner that would
materially harm competition on the covered platform; or (3)
discriminate in the application or enforcement of the covered
platform’s terms of service among similarly situated business users in
a manner that may materially harm competition on the covered
platform.137

With the House Judiciary Committee having already cleared a similar version of
the bill in June 2021 by a vote of twenty-four to twenty, the Senate Judiciary
Committee passed the bill by a vote of sixteen to six in January 2022, referring
the bill to the full Senate.138 It is anticipated that these bills will be voted on by
the House and Senate later in 2022.
Another Senate bill, focusing on app stores, would make it illegal for Google
and Apple to continue their practice of self-preferencing their own app stores
and preventing the creation of third-party app stores on their platforms.139 That

135
American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(1)-(3) (2021);
Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct Prevention Act of 2020, S. 3426, 116th Cong. (2019-2020); American
Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2021) § 2(a)-(b). In a significant display of
momentum, the Department of Justice has endorsed these bills. Ryan Tracy, Antitrust Bill Targeting Amazon,
Google, Apple, Gets Support From DOJ, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/doj-backs-antitrust-billtargeting-amazon-google-apple-11648519385 (Mar. 28, 2022, 10:34 p.m.).
136
See American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. (2021); Anticompetitive
Exclusionary Conduct Prevention Act of 2020, S. 3426, 116th Cong. (2019-2020); American Innovation and
Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2021).
137
American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(a) (2021).
138
Cat Zakrzewski & Gerrit de Vynck, Senate Advances Antitrust Legislation, Despite Reservations from
California Democrats, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/01/20/
senate-advances-antitrust-bill/.
139
Open App Markets Act, S. 2710, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (2021).
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bill passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2022 by an
overwhelming vote of twenty to two.140
Critics of these proposals, including those funded by Big Tech companies,
argue that discriminatory practices and self-preferencing may be procompetitive.141 The legislative proposals anticipate this argument and include
affirmative defenses for discriminatory conduct that would not result in harm to
the competitive process, would be necessary to protect user privacy, or would
increase consumer welfare.142 By prohibiting Big Tech companies from
discriminatory self-preferencing—but allowing affirmative pro-competitive
defenses—the proposed legislation is likely to promote greater deterrence of
exclusionary conduct. Such a “change would be justified by the recognition that
such . . . conduct by dominant networks involve greater harms from false
negatives than false positives.”143 That is, such burden-shifting reflects a
rethinking of error cost analysis that views under-deterrence of Big Tech’s
exclusionary self-preferencing as a bigger threat to competition than overdeterrence.144 The legislation provides clear rules, reducing high enforcement
costs that result in under-deterrence of Big Tech’s anticompetitive conduct.145
Both the Senate and House versions of the two self-preferencing pieces of
legislation have bipartisan support, but it is unclear whether such proposals will
secure sufficient support to overcome a Senate filibuster.146 However, the
140
Cat Zakrzewski, Apple Avoided the Washington Techlash for Years. Now it’s at the Center of the Bull’s
Eye, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2022, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/02/03/applecompetition-senate-app-store/.
141
Michael Salinger, Self-Preferencing, in GLOB. ANTITRUST INST. REPORT ON THE DIGITAL ECON. 329,
365–68 (2020); AURELIEN PORTUESE, “PLEASE, HELP YOURSELF”: TOWARD A TAXONOMY OF SELFPREFERENCING 2 (2021), https://itif.org/publications/2021/10/25/please-help-yourself-toward-taxonomy-selfpreferencing (“The antitrust literature acknowledges the proconsumer, procompetitive effects on selfpreferencing. Yet, despite the overwhelmingly positive effects of self-preferencing on strengthening
competition, antitrust populists aim to weaponize self-preferencing to target only a few companies, while
allowing self-preferencing for the rest of the economy.”); D. BRUCE HOFFMAN & GARRETT D. SHINN, SELFPREFERENCING AND ANTITRUST: HARMFUL SOLUTIONS FOR AN IMPROBABLE PROBLEM 3, 11 (2021); Sam
Bowman & Geoffrey Manne, Platform Self-Preferencing Can Be Good for Consumers and Even Competitors,
TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Mar. 4, 2021), https://truthonthemarket.com/2021/03/04/platform-self-preferencingcan-be-good-for-consumers-and-even-competitors/.
142
American Choice and Innovation Online Act, H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. § 2(c) (2021); American
Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. § 2(d) (2021).
143
Steven Salop, Dominant Digital Platforms: Is Antitrust Up to the Task, 130 YALE L.J.F. 563, 585
(2021).
144
JONATHAN BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM 73–77 (2019).
145
Rohit Chopra & Lina M. Khan, The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking, 87 U.
CHI. L. REV. 357, 360–62 (2020).
146
Press Release, Amy Klobuchar, Sen., Klobuchar, Grassley, Colleagues to Introduce Bipartisan
Legislation to Rein in Big Tech (Oct. 14, 2021) (available at https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.
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margin of support in the Senate Judiciary Committee for both bills suggests that
the votes may be there.
Yet, another bill introduced in the House would go further and prevent
digital platforms from having conflicts of interest by concurrently owning or
controlling the online platform and other businesses or product lines that are sold
on the platform.147 Under this House version, for example, Amazon would be
prohibited from both owning the Amazon platform and selling its own Amazon
Basics product line on the platform.148 The proposed legislation has no procompetitive defenses and could have the practical effect of breaking up several
Big Tech companies, akin to a Glass-Steagall Act for the Internet.149 It is
consistent with structural separation requirements in other industries.150 As its
principal co-sponsor Representative Pramila Jayapal put it, “My legislation is a
structural solution to a structural problem.”151 The bill narrowly cleared the
House Judiciary Committee.152
Finally, there is proposed legislation that would prohibit conflicts of interest
in the online display advertising market. Senator Mike Lee is schedule to
introduce in 2022 legislation that would reportedly require Google to divest
major parts of its dominant advertising technology operations.153 It also would
require “unprecedented transparency to the murky world of digital ad trading,
where deception, conflicts of interest and insider dealing have been rampant
cfm/2021/10/klobuchar-grassley-colleagues-to-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-rein-in-big-tech); see MarkUp, Committee on the Judiciary (June 23, 2021) (available at https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
ByEvent.aspx?EventID=112818) (H.R. 3816 agreed on roll call vote of twenty-four “ayes” and twenty “nos”);
Anna Edgerton & Siri Bulusu, Senate Judiciary Panel Clears Tech-Focused Antitrust Bill, Bloomberg (Jan. 20,
2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-20/senate-judiciary-committee-clears-tech-focusedantitrust-bill (S.2992 clears Senate Judiciary Committee by a vote of sixteen to six).
147
Ending Platform Monopolies Act, H.R. 3825, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).
148
Dana Mattioli & Ryan Tracy, House Bill Seeks to Break Up Amazon and Other Big Tech Companies,
WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2021, 6:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-other-tech-giants-could-beforced-to-shed-assets-under-house-bill-11623423248.
149
Id. (“One of the proposed measures, titled the Ending Platform Monopolies Act, seeks to require
structural separation of Amazon and other big technology companies to break up their businesses.”).
150
Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1037–52 (2019)
(discussing separation regimes in railroads, banking, television, and telecommunications).
151
Press Release, Pramila Jayapal, Congresswoman, House of Reps., Jayapal’s Landmark Big Tech
Legislation Passes House Judiciary Committee (June 24, 2021) (available at https://jayapal.house.gov/2021/06/
24/big-tech-legislation-passes-judiciary-committee/).
152
See Mark-Up, Comm. on the Judiciary (June 23, 2021) (available at https://docs.house.gov/Committee/
Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=112818) (H.R. 3825 agreed on roll call vote of twenty-one “ayes” and twenty
“nos”).
153
Josh Sisco, Sarah Krouse & Mark Di Stefano, Senators Target Google with New Bill to Break Its Grip
on Murky Ad Tech Market, THE INFORMATION (Jan. 28, 2022, 2:09 PM), https://www.theinformation.com/
articles/senators-target-google-with-new-bill-to-break-its-grip-on-murky-ad-tech-market.
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from its inception.”154 As Senator Lee stated at a Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing, “It is hard to imagine a circumstance in which one can own the
exchange platform and also be a buyer, seller, broker, dealer . . . without
something anticompetitive going on in purpose and effect.”155 If passed, such
legislation would require structural divestitures from the largest companies in
the only display advertising markets, and impose obligations on other buy-side
and sell-side brokers to maximize transparency and reduce conflicts of
interest.156
D. Data Portability and Interoperability
Data portability is “the ability . . . of a natural or legal person to request that
a data holder transfer to the person, or to a specific third party, data concerning
that person in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format on an
ad-hoc or continuous basis.”157 Relatedly, “[t]he term interoperability . . . refers
to the ability of different digital services to work together and communicate with
one another.”158
Data portability and interoperability reform should make it easier for
consumers to use different technology products together. Interoperability is
common in other markets such as email, telephone, and telegraph.159 For
example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires each telecommunication
carrier “to interconnect . . . with the facilities and equipment of other
telecommunication carriers” and requires “[e]ach local exchange carrier” to
provide “number portability in accordance with requirements prescribed by the
[Federal Communications] Commission.”160 The Act also required a
telecommunications provider “to honor a consumer request to provide relevant
information to rivals to perform competing services.”161

154

Id.
Senate Hearing on the Impact of Corporate Monopolies on Innovation, C-SPAN, at 58:00 (Dec. 15,
2021), https://www.c-span.org/video/?516757-1/senate-hearing-impact-corporate-monopolies-innovation.
156
Id.
157
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., DATA PORTABILITY, INTEROPERABILITY AND DIGITAL PLATFORM
COMPETITION 10 (2021) (citation omitted).
158
Id. at 12–13.
159
Id. at 8.
160
47 U.S.C. §§ 251(a)(1), 251(b)(2).
161
HAROLD FELD, THE CASE FOR THE DIGITAL PLATFORM ACT: MARKET STRUCTURE AND REGULATION
OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS 24, 78–80 (2019), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Casefor-the-Digital-Platform-Act-201905.pdf; see also 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(2) (“A telecommunication carrier shall
disclose customer proprietary network information, upon affirmative written request by the customer, to any
person designated by the customer.”).
155
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Interoperability breaks down the power of network effects, allowing
competitors to access existing networks at the market level rather than the
company level.162 Online platforms often make the cost of switching to
alternative platforms unnecessarily high, reducing consumer choice and raising
barriers to competition.163 Facebook, for example, makes it almost impossible
for users to export their own Facebook data to a competing social network
platform.164
Proposed legislation in the House requires Big Tech platforms to maintain
transparent, third-party accessible interfaces that enable data portability, which
should “enable the secure transfer of data to a user, or with the affirmative
consent of a user, to a business user at the direction of a user, in a structured,
commonly used, and machine-readable format.”165 These platforms must also
enable interoperability—that is, maintain interfaces that “facilitate and maintain
interoperability with a competing business or a potential competing business.”166
A Senate bill likewise makes it unlawful to restrict or impede the capacity of a
business to interoperate with a covered platform if the platform operator’s own
services compete with services offered by business users on the platform.167
These proposals attempt to give consumers greater control over their own
information. Data portability is initiated by the user, avoiding the traditional
legal challenges in the refusal to deal context.168 Absent the consumer’s request
for its own data, dominant platforms are not required to share user data with
competitors.169 Unlike competition law in other countries, current antitrust law
in the United States rarely imposes a duty to deal with rivals.170 And
interoperability promotes competition within digital ecosystems, reducing Big
Tech’s ability to use its market power in one part of a digital ecosystem to force
consumers to use its services in other segments of the ecosystem.171 These
reforms recognize the inherent problems of network effects and high switching
costs that make Big Tech markets prone to tipping in favor of incumbent

162

INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION, supra note 38, at 384–85.
Id.
164
Id. at 144–47.
165
Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act of 2021, H.R. 3849,
117th Cong. §§ 1, 3(a).
166
Id. § 4(a).
167
American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2021).
168
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 157.
169
SYKES, supra note 88, at 15.
170
Id. at 15–16 (“[C]urrent antitrust doctrine does not offer an attractive means of imposing
interoperability or data portability on Big Tech firms that do not already offer those options.”).
171
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 157, at 20–21.
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platforms.172 As Herbert Hovenkamp noted, “Network effects can be a
formidable barrier to entry, but interoperability can facilitate the entry and
survival of small firms.”173
These measures enjoy bipartisan support. Senator Josh Hawley has said that
“[y]our data is your property. Period. Consumers should have the flexibility to
choose new online platforms without artificial barriers to entry.”174 In the House
minority report on digital markets, Republicans expressed support for
“empowering consumers to take control of their user data through data
portability and interoperability standards. . . . As with the individual’s ability to
switch their cell phone number between carriers, these data portability policies
present an opportunity for the American people to take control of their data
decision-making.”175 The proposal has numerous Democratic and Republican
co-sponsors and cleared the House Judiciary Committee by a vote of twentyfive to nineteen.176
E. Executive Orders and FTC Rulemaking
The final proposal for addressing Big Tech’s abuse of power is to bypass the
legislative approach and pursue more vigorous FTC rulemaking authority.
President Biden’s Executive Order reflects this impulse, setting forth policy
positions, creating a White House Competition Council, and identifying dozens
of anticompetitive concerns that agencies are ordered or encouraged to enact.177
In the Executive Order, the FTC is “encouraged . . . to exercise the [its] statutory
rulemaking authority . . . [in] unfair competition in major Internet
marketplaces.”178 Consistent with this Executive Order, the FTC updated its
rulemaking authority to pave the way for more effective rulemaking to protect
consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices.179 These changes set the

172
STIGLER CTR. STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS:
FINAL REPORT 34–36 (2019).
173
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 1952, 2037 (2021).
174
Press Release, Sen. Mark R. Warner, Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Encourage Competition in
Social Media (Oct. 22, 2019) (available at https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/10/senatorsintroduce-bipartisan-bill-to-encourage-competition-in-social-media).
175
BUCK, supra note 81, at 5, 9.
176
H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 117TH CONG., FINAL PASSAGE ON H.R. 3849 (June 23, 2021),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20210623/112818/CRPT-117-JU00-Vote014-20210623.pdf.
177
Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36987, 36990 (July 9, 2021).
178
Id. at 36991.
179
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Votes to Update Rulemaking Procedures, Sets Stage for
Stronger Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct (July 1, 2021) (available at https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2021/07/ftc-votes-update-rulemaking-procedures-sets-stage-stronger).
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stage for the FTC to promulgate administrative rules to address Big Tech’s abuse
of its market power.
Republican reaction to this Executive Order has been noticeably muted,
particularly in light of strong statements of support from the likes of the
Republican-leaning trade associations such as the American Farm Bureau, the
National Grange, and the U.S. Cattlemen’s Association.180 It remains unclear
whether Republicans who are deeply skeptical of Big Tech power will support
more vigorous regulatory action in the form of Executive Orders and FTC
administrative rules. Part of the answer may depend on whether Big Tech
successfully thwarts other avenues of reform.
In a similar fashion, the Federal Trade Commission rescinded a 2015
antitrust policy statement that aligned FTC’s Section 5 authority to challenge
unfair methods of competition with the Sherman Act and Clayton Act.181 While
the Republican FTC Commissioners expressed dismay at this action,182 a faithful
reading of Section 5 of the FTC Act would admit that “[i]t is . . . textually
apparent that [S]ection 5 is more open-textured and general than [S]ections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act, and therefore that [S]ection 5 must prohibit everything
that the Sherman Act prohibits, and more.”183
It is not clear that Republicans will accept progressives at the FTC taking a
broader approach to rulemaking and enforcing Section 5 of the FTC Act. But
conservative scholars and judges committed to textualism may prefer a
consistent application of their mode of statutory interpretation, particularly if it
aligns with their commitment to addressing Big Tech’s unfair practices.184

180
Matt Stoller, Biden Launches Sweeping Action on “Big Tech, Big Pharma, and Big Ag.” Can It Be
Real?, BIG BY MATT STOLLER (July 11, 2021), https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/biden-launches-sweepingaction-on.
181
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Rescinds 2015 Policy that Limited Its Enforcement Ability
Under the FTC Act (July 1, 2021) (available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/07/ftcrescinds-2015-policy-limited-its-enforcement-ability-under).
182
Noah Phillips, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Regarding the Commission’s Withdrawal of Section 5
Policy Statement (July 1, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1591578/
phillips_remarks_regarding_withdrawal_of_section_5_policy_statement.pdf; Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding ‘Unfair Methods of Competition’ Under
Section 5 of the FTC Act (2015) (July 1, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1591554/p210100wilsoncommnmeetingdissent.pdf.
183
Daniel Crane, Antitrust Antitextualism, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1205, 1233 (2021).
184
See id. at 1212, 1227.
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IV. BIG TECH IS VIOLATING EXISTING ANTITRUST LAWS
There is broad bipartisan consensus that Big Tech companies are violating
current antitrust laws.185 One of the more remarkable features of the current
antitrust environment is the sheer number of antitrust cases against Google and
Facebook and the depth and breadth of support among federal enforcers and state
attorneys general.
A. Litigation Against Facebook
There are currently two major government cases against Facebook. The first
was brought on December 9, 2020, by the Trump administration’s FTC and
amended under the Biden administration with a more detailed complaint
following a dismissal with leave to amend.186 The other was brought on the same
date by a forty-eight-state coalition led by the New York State Attorney General
and joined by twenty-five Democratic, twenty-two Republican, and one
independent state attorneys general. In announcing the complaint, the FTC’s
Director of the Bureau of Competition, Ian Conner, stated, “We bring these
claims in coordination with attorneys general from across the country, and we
greatly appreciate the cooperative efforts of all of the enforcers involved in this
investigation.”187 Likewise, New York State Attorney General Letitia James
emphasized that “[a]lmost every state in this nation has joined this bipartisan
lawsuit because Facebook’s efforts to dominate the market were as illegal as
they were harmful.”188
Both complaints allege that Facebook unlawfully abused its market power
to eliminate or destroy competition by acquiring potential competitors such as
Instagram and WhatsApp and adopting and enforcing policies that blocked rival
apps from interconnecting their product with Facebook.189 The killer acquisition
of competitors like Instagram and WhatsApp deprives users of the benefit of
independent competitors, which undermines innovation, eliminates incentives to
185
Mackenzie Holland, Antitrust Reform Is Uncertain Despite Bipartisan Support, TECHTARGET (Nov. 12,
2021), https://searchcio.techtarget.com/news/252509429/Antitrust-reform-is-uncertain-despite-bipartisan-support.
186
See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. 1:20-CV-03590, (Dec. 9, 2020); Amended
Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Case No: 1:20-cv-3590.
187
Statement of FTC Bureau of Competition Director Ian Conner on the Facebook Enforcement Action,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Statement of Ian Conner], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
attachments/press-releases/ftc-sues-facebook-illegal-monopolization/statement_of_ftc_bc_director_ian_conner
_on_fb_enforcement_action.pdf.
188
Attorney General James Leads Multistate Lawsuit Seeking to End Facebook’s Illegal Monopoly, N.Y.
ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/attorney-general-james-leads-multistate-lawsuit-seekingend-facebooks-illegal.
189
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, at 26, 35; Statement of Ian Conner, supra note 187.
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enhance performance, and deters competitive entry.190 And the imposition of
anticompetitive contractual terms with app developers suppressed the ability and
incentive for those apps to become competitive threats to Facebook.
Particularly noteworthy is the bipartisan consensus that the acquisition of
nascent potential competitors may be viewed as an exclusionary practice, rather
than simply viewed through the lens of opportunities to collude or increase
prices.191 That view is shared by the federal district court hearing the case, with
the court recently confirming that the acquisition and continued holding of
merged assets could constitute an antitrust violation.192
B. Litigation Against Google
There are several government cases against Google, reflecting strong
bipartisan support for curtailing Google’s monopoly practices. The first
government case filed against Google was filed in October 2020 by the Trump
administration’s DOJ and eleven Republican state attorneys general, alleging
that Google abused its monopoly power in search and search advertising.193
Three Democratic state attorneys general joined that complaint in December
2020,194 and the Biden administration has continued to prosecute the case.
The complaint alleges that Google accounts for “nearly 90 percent of all
general-search-engine queries in the United States and almost 95 percent of
queries on mobile devices.”195 “Google monetizes this search monopoly in the
markets for search advertising and general search text advertising,” with
advertisers paying Google approximately $40 billion annually to place ads on
Google’s general search results page.196 Google abuses its monopoly position
by, among other things, entering into exclusivity agreements that forbid
preinstallation of competing search services and into revenue sharing
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Amended Complaint, supra note 186, at 5.
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(D.D.C. June 28, 2021) (mem.). The state AG action against Facebook was dismissed on the basis of laches.
That decision is on appeal. Leah Nylen, State AGs Will Appeal Loss in Facebook Case, POLITICO (July 28, 2021,
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193
Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google for Violating Antitrust Laws
(Oct. 20, 2020) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-googleviolating-antitrust-laws).
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agreements with mobile device manufacturers and carriers on both Android and
Apple devices.197
Attorney General William Barr remarked that “[c]ompetition in this industry
is vitally important, which is why today’s challenge against Google—the
gatekeeper of the Internet—for violating antitrust laws is a monumental case
both for the Department of Justice and for the American people.”198 He
continued, adding that “[t]his lawsuit strikes at the heart of Google’s grip over
the internet for millions of American consumers, advertisers, small businesses,
and entrepreneurs beholden to an unlawful monopolist.”199
The second government complaint against Google came on December 16,
2020, alleging that Google had abused its monopoly power in online display
advertising.200 Led by the state of Texas, a total of seventeen state attorneys
general—fifteen Republican and two Democratic—have alleged that Google
abused its market power for display advertising by forcing publishers and
advertisers to use Google products and services rather than rivals.201 According
to the complaint, Google has monopoly power on the sell side, the buy side, the
exchange, and adjacent markets.202 Despite the inherent conflicts of interest that
this creates, Google uses its monopoly power throughout these different markets
to advantage itself at the expenses of its own clients.203 It leverages its market
power through its intermediaries strategically located in different segments of
the ad tech stack.204 In almost every case, the function of these intermediaries is
to advantage Google rather than to enhance consumer welfare or promote
competition.205
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton said that “Google’s monopolization of
the display-advertising industry and its misleading business practices stifle
innovation, limit consumer choice and reduce competition.”206 He added,
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“Texas and its coalition of allied states bring this action to lift the veil on
Google’s secret practices and secure relief to prevent it from engaging in future
deceptive and misleading practices.”207
Third, on the following day, December 17, 2020, the state attorneys general
from Colorado and Nebraska led a bipartisan coalition in filing a complaint
alleging that “Google has systematically degraded the ability of other companies
to access consumers.”208 In addition to addressing Google’s misuse of its
monopoly power in search to control and dominate the search advertising
market, the complaint went further than the DOJ complaint and also argued that
Google excludes competition in the Internet of Things—that is, in the emerging
market for consumer access to general search through home smart speakers,
televisions, and cars.209 The complaint also addresses Google’s monopoly
practices to hinder access to information in specialized vertical commercial
market segments such as travel, home improvement, and entertainment.210
Thirty-eight state attorneys general—twenty-three Democratic, thirteen
Republican, and one independent—joined the complaint.211 The case was
consolidated in January 2021 with the DOJ search case for all pretrial purposes,
including discovery and all related proceedings.212
A fourth government action against Google, filed on June 8, 2021, in Ohio
state court by the Republican State Attorney General, David Yost, alleges that
Google is a common carrier or public utility and, as such, “has a duty not to
feature Google products and services in a manner designed to steer search traffic
to Google products and services instead of organic search results without
providing equal access to such steering mechanisms to Google’s competitors in
business lines other than internet search.”213 The complaint cites a concurring
opinion from Justice Thomas contending that “[t]here is a fair argument that
some digital platforms are sufficiently akin to common carriers or places of
accommodation to be regulated in this manner.”214 But the complaint is short—

https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-leads-multistate-coalition-lawsuit-againstgoogle-anticompetitive-practices-and-deceptive).
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only seventeen pages—and does not provide details as to why Google should be
treated as a common carrier or public utility.215
A fifth government action against Google was filed on July 7, 2021, alleging
that Google had abused its monopoly power by requiring app developers that
offer their apps through the Google Play Store to use Google Play Billing as a
middleman.216 This has the effect of forcing consumers to pay Google’s
commission—up to thirty percent—on in-app purchases of digital content sold
through apps on Google Play Store.217 Thirty-six state attorneys general—
eighteen Democratic and eighteen Republican—joined the complaint.218 Utah
Attorney General Sean Reyes said, “Utah and the other states in our coalition
are fighting back to protect our citizens and innovative app developers—
including many small businesses across America—from Google’s unlawful
practices.”219
What is remarkable about these cases is the extent to which there is
bipartisan consensus to challenge Google’s and Facebook’s anticompetitive
conduct.220 As the following chart reveals, almost every state has joined two or
more of these five complaints. Twenty Republican and eighteen Democratic
state attorneys general have joined three or more complaints and eleven
Republican and one Democratic state attorneys general have joined four
complaints.221
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Republican state attorneys general are the most active participants in all of
these complaints, with a total of eighty-seven Republican state attorneys general
signatures to these five complaints and sixty-seven Democratic state attorneys
general signatures to these complaints. Typically, Republican state attorneys
general are more likely to join complaints brought by Democratic state attorneys
general—the New York-led Facebook and the Colorado-led Google vertical
search complaints—than Democratic state attorneys general are willing to join
complaints led by Republican state attorneys general—the Texas-led Google
advertising complaint—or Google search complaint filed by the Trump
administration’s DOJ.
C. Investigations Against Apple and Amazon
State and federal antitrust enforcers have yet to file a complaint against
Apple but have opened investigations into Apple’s anticompetitive conduct in
the app distribution market.227 Likewise, with the exception of the District of
Columbia’s lawsuit against Amazon regarding its price parity clauses,228 state

227
Diane Bartz, Exclusive: iPhone App Makers Questioned in U.S. Antitrust Probe of Apple, REUTERS
(Feb. 4, 2020, 12:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-antitrust-apple-exclusive/exclusive-iphoneapp-makers-questioned-in-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-apple-sources-idUSKBN1ZY29M.
228
Press Release, Karl Racine, Off. of the Att’y Gen. for D.C., AG Racine Files Antitrust Lawsuit Against
Amazon to End Its Illegal Control of Prices Across Online Retail Market (May 25, 2021) (available at
https://oag.dc.gov/release/ag-racine-files-antitrust-lawsuit-against-amazon).
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and federal enforcers are investigating, but have yet to file a case regarding,
Amazon’s alleged anticompetitive conduct.229
D. Litigation Reflecting Shared Consensus
Almost all of these cases against Facebook and Google are in the early
stages, and it remains to be seen whether governments will prevail in their
claims.230 Nonetheless, the decision to bring such cases is momentous and
reflects a shared consensus around the world and across the political spectrum
that significant resources should be deployed to address Big Tech’s monopoly
practices. These cases are conservative in that they assiduously apply existing
case law to the present facts to argue that Google and Facebook are engaging in
abusive monopoly practices.231 None of the complaints suggest that courts
should eschew traditional antitrust standards regarding, for example, consumer
welfare, market definition, market power, anticompetitive conduct, or
anticompetitive effects.
Nonetheless, the complaints are aggressive in that they argue for a broad
array of remedies—including structural reforms—that are more likely to
meaningfully address the anticompetitive landscape than simply monetary
damages or behavioral remedies.232 Even still, the remedies proposed in these
complaints are included for traditional reasons—i.e., because they would
enhance competition (for example, by increasing output, decreasing prices,
improving product quality, or spurring innovation).233 There is no suggestion in
these complaints that antitrust remedies are necessary to address concerns
traditionally considered outside of consumer welfare, such as political power,
curtailment of free speech, or social inequality.234
Federal and state enforcers recognize that applying traditional antitrust
principles to complex monopoly practices by digital platforms presents unusual

229
Victor Malachard, 5 Things You Need to Know About the Amazon Antitrust Probe, NOZZLE,
https://insights.nozzle.ai/amazon-antitrust-probe (last visited Apr. 27, 2022).
230
The one adverse dispositive ruling came on June 28, 2021, when a federal district court dismissed New
York’s case against Facebook on the grounds of laches. New York v. Facebook, No. 1:20-CV-03589, at *67
(D.D.C. June 28, 2021). The state AGs are appealing that ruling as of July 2021. See Nylen, supra note 192.
231
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problems.235 They fully appreciate that courts will continue to hew closely to
existing antitrust jurisprudence and attempt to apply that jurisprudence to these
novel circumstances.236 As scholars have noted, “[A]bsent legislation, changes
[from the courts] will be around the edges and incremental, as courts continue
to determine how robustly the U.S. antitrust goals can accommodate such values
as innovation, quality, and dynamic competition without crossing the boundaries
into unreliable speculation.”237
These cases were brought notwithstanding the fact than “an antienforcement bias has haunted antitrust since the late twentieth century.”238 State
and federal enforcers—fully recognizing that courts are skeptical of
monopolization cases—have nonetheless chosen to expend significant resources
to rebut the anti-enforcement presumption inherent in the current jurisprudence
by vigorously pursuing Section 2 cases in federal courts against Big Tech
companies.239 In short, there is bipartisan consensus reflected in the state and
federal complaints that Google’s and Facebook’s behavior violate existing
antitrust laws.240 Similarly, there are ongoing bipartisan investigations of
potential antitrust violations by other Big Tech companies, including Apple and
Amazon.241
CONCLUSION
One should not be Pollyannish about the bipartisan consensus on Big Tech.
The obstacles on the road to meaningful reform are significant.242 Legislative
proposals will be fiercely contested and difficult to enact.243 Litigation will
require lengthy prosecution of cases applying existing antitrust jurisprudence
and convincing courts to impose effective remedies, including structural
relief.244
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Many of the problems related to Big Tech go beyond traditional antitrust
remedies. While it is easy to agree about the threat Big Tech poses to American
society, it is more difficult to agree on the solutions. Some of these problems—
such as Big Tech’s influence on elections or the coarsening of public
discourse—are beyond the reach of traditional antitrust laws. Others fall
squarely within the domain of protecting American consumers, such as from the
monopoly profits Google earns from controlling online advertising. In between
are non-price harms, which fall within an expansive understanding of consumer
welfare but nonetheless are difficult to measure, such as concerns relating to
consumer privacy.
The impetus to be more aggressive against Big Tech masks the continuum
of views on the appropriate level of antitrust reform.245 We should not assume
that because Republicans and Democrats agree on the core problems relating to
Big Tech that they are going to agree on everything. Republicans are unlikely to
abandon the consumer welfare standard in favor of citizen welfare, as many
Democrats have proposed. Democrats are unlikely to abandon the FTC’s role in
enforcing antitrust laws, as some Republicans have proposed. Many
progressives will push the envelope further than they should, and many
conservatives will resist change that is warranted under the current
circumstances. Nonetheless, the fact that Republicans and Democrats cannot
agree on everything should not obscure the fact that they agree on many things
when it comes to the perils of Big Tech.
Lurking in the background are the billions of dollars that the largest
technology companies in the world have at their disposal to employ lobbyists,
law firms, economists, think tanks, pollsters, and influencers who will do
everything in their power to resist change and defend Big Tech’s monopoly
power.246 Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google have combined over $500
billion cash on reserve,247 and therefore they have almost unlimited resources to
influence their preferred political outcomes. Big Tech companies are the biggest
corporate lobbying spenders in the country, hiring over 330 lobbyists and
spending over “$124 million on lobbying and campaign contributions” in
2020.248 They routinely use lobbying firms such as NetChoice, Chamber of
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Progress, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the Information Technology
and Innovation Foundation as fronts to push their agenda.249 Any efforts at
legislative reform must be done in the context of these political headwinds.
Likewise on the litigation front, Big Tech has hired dozens of law firms250
to defend their monopoly practices and pursue a war of attrition that includes
delay, forum shopping, noncompliance with discovery requests, unreasonable
privilege logs, sanitized documents, and strategic obfuscation.251 The federal
and state complaints filed against Google and Facebook go to the heart of their
business models, and there are few limits to what they will spend to defend their
behavior and maintain the status quo. If a company like Google earns over $700
million a day,252 much of it from monopoly practices in online advertising, every
day that delays a finding of liability is a victory for Google. Despite the strong
bipartisan consensus on holding Big Tech companies accountable for abuse of
their monopoly power, the path of litigation is slow, expensive, and uncertain.
We are in a pivotal moment in antitrust history. Republicans and Democrats
are both realigning in a way that fears the concentrated power of digital
platforms. On the Republican side, social conservatives recognize Big Tech as
aligned against their interests and committed to undermining their voices and
values. Republicans also are increasingly a populist party of the working class,
and that political trajectory is in tension with another traditional Republican
impulse to align with big business interests. Democrats have their own
internecine battles, with progressives aligned against Davos Democrats. Recent
appointments and pronouncements suggest that the Biden administration has
unequivocally departed from the Obama administration’s lax antitrust approach
https://www.citizen.org/article/big-tech-lobbying-update/.
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toward monopolies, which utterly failed to address Big Tech’s monopoly
power.253 The confluence of these changes portends a rare moment of public
sentiment and political consensus to challenge the abuse of power through state
and federal litigation and bipartisan legislation.
There is no magic solution to solve the myriad problems posed by Big Tech
companies such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. The best strategy is
to find common ground between Republicans and Democrats on some of the
core problems that Big Tech poses to American society and pursue commonsense legislation, regulation, and litigation to address them.
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